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A MODEL OF "APPLIED ETHICS" INA MA TION SAFETY: 
THE A WITIONSAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM 
LaMarr Stanford and Willem Homan 
Recently it was reparted in the popular news media that 25 San Diego State University students were caught cheating 
on an ethics exam @tine, 1999). Internet sights like <www.schoolsucks.com> will sell you a canned essay for $19.97 
(Ware, 1999). The President, trying to escape responsibility for a tawdry affair, blatantly lies to the country on national 
television (Chen, 1998). As for aviation, imagine the following not-so-unrealistic scenarios involving airmen. The pilot 
of a Boeing 747 over the mid-Atlantic, with 400+ passengers on board, descends through an assigned altitude and 
narrowly misses another airliner flying below. The 747 crew, fearful of ramifications, remains silent about the mishap. 
The other airplane's crew is unaware of their narrow brush with death, and since there is no radar coverage over the mid- 
Atlantic, the incident goes unreported A young aspiring pilot surreptitiously adds some fictitious "Parker Pen" flight time 
in his logbook to obtain a job that requires more flight experience than he or she currently has. 
The rational conclusion to all these events is that we are descending to the depths of a valueless nation. Situational 
ethics and self-serving rationalizations of auy despicable situation seem to be not only accepted but expected. While this 
atmosphere is tolerated in many areas of society, there are niches where public safety considerations make it imperative 
that the substandard conduct of individuals in the system be exposed and corrected. The field of aviation safety is a prime 
example. 
SAFETY TRUTHS AND THE WALLS OF SILENCE 
A monumental scientific truth has emerged over the last 50 
years of analyzing aviation safety statistics. Aviation safety 
experts have found that for every aviation accident there is a 
large number of related incidents that precede a final 
catastrophe. In other words, there are probably 500 near 
misses for every mid-air collision. It follows that if the 
aviation safety community can obtain a good sampling of 
these incidents for analysis, it can reliably predict where 
serious safety compromises may be developing and alert the 
industry. Incident reporting is a crucial link in the safety 
chain. 
A current example of a serious safety concern emerging is 
the pilots' use of computers and automation on the flight deck. 
Airline pilots become very comfortable and dependent on 
these marvelous gadgets; however, these devices do 
experience failure and can be complex to program in a time- 
compressed situation. There is also a generation of senior 
pilots who are not as conversant and adept at using t hs  
cumputer-based technology interface as their junior co-pilots 
(Wiener L Nagel, 1987). Furthermore, in recent years most 
of the new generation airliners have changed fiom a three- 
person flight crew to just two pilots, consequently making 
automation more critical than ever. 
In the early 1970s, the aviation safety experts came to 
another monumental but hstrating conclusion. Many of the 
most informative and trend-setting incidents were not being 
reported, and the safety benefits were not being passed on to 
the aviation industry. The reason was simple. Incidents are 
often the result of errors andlor questionable judgement of the 
@ht crew. What crew member with a mortgage and a family 
to support is going to voluntady divulge self-incriminating 
information, even if it has serious safety consequences for 
other aviators? In this environment, flight crews simply 
remained silent and waited for the FAA or someone in the 
airline management to discover the incident. Airline 
management was often reluctant to report incidents as well. In 
fact, management faced the same dilemma as the pilots, 
namely the possibility of an FAA fine or some other sanction 
as a result of the incident. The upshot of the matter was that 
there was a wall of silence punctuated by the not too 
infrequent sound of aluminum bending and smashing. 
The whole incident reporting system was founded on 
anfixcement or policing action taken by the FAA through the 
use of informants and inspection procedures that often were 
ineffective. Moreover, the nature of incident investigation 
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often put the FAA and the aviation community in adversary 
roles. The result was a c'them-versus-us" mentality that 
impeded accurate incident reporting. 
This situation set the stage for a deadly airline accident in 
1974 (Shaw, 1974). The extent of the problem was painfully 
brought home after a TWA Boeing 727 crashed into the side 
of Round IW, Virginia on December 1, 1974. AU 92 
passengers and crewmembers died instantly when the pilots 
prematurely descended past the minimum safe altitude on a 
mght approach into Dulles Airport (NTSB, 1975). During the 
subsequent accident investigation, it was revealed that a 
United Airlines crew had mistakenly taken the same course of 
action on the same approach for the same runway just 6 weeks 
earlier. At the last minute, the United crew was able to see its 
mistake and take timely and safe corrective action. They 
reported the incident to United Flight Operations who, for 
obvious self-serving reasons, did not immediately pass it on 
to the FAA. The rest is history. The National Transportation 
and Safety Board, in its final report on the TWA 5 14 accident 
and the preceding United incident, stated: 
In retrospect, the Board finds it most unfortunate 
that an incident of this nature was not, at the time of 
its occurrence, subject to uninhibited reporting and 
subsequent investigation, which might have resulted 
in broad and timely dissemination of the safety 
message issued by the canier to its own flight crews. 
(National T m q m k t i ~ n  and Safety Board, 1975, p. 
29) 
THE AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING PROGRAM 
Following the United incident and the subsequent TWA 
accident, the FAA realized that they could not have a 
policeman on every comer and an informant in every airline. 
A creative plan for drawing out the self-incrim.inating incident 
information was introduced to the aviation community. The 
idea was somewhat revolutionary for the time but may have 
been a derivative of the "whistle blowers" legislation directed 
at drawing out abuses in the environmental area and the 
militrny industrial complex. The key ingredient of the FAA's 
initiative was that any airmen (including air tr&c controller7 
aviation certitied mechanic, etc.) who voluntarily sent in 
incident infnmatiun to the FAA within 10 days of an incident 
would be granted immunity from any penalties that may be 
imposed after an investigation of the incident took place. 
However, timing for the project was awkward. The Vietnam 
War had deeply divided the country. The only thing the public 
could agree on was that they all had a deep distrust of 
government In this co&ontational environment, the aviation 
community, led by the AOPA (Aircraft Owners and Pilots 
Association) and &PA (Airline Pilots Association), soundly 
rejected this first initiative. The FAA had to deal with the 
issue of trust, or lack thereof. Under the proposed plan, evely 
reported incident would be investigated and appropriate 
enforcement action taken. After the enforcement action was 
taken, the airman would get immunity from the penalty. The 
e n f i i e n t  action would remain indefinitely on the airman's 
record in Oklahoma City. The risk was too high for the benefit 
gained to the airman. The wall of silence remained 
immovable. 
Fortunately, the U.S. commercial aviation industry was 
genuinely safety-minded for many self-serving reasons. 
Airline pilots had a great deal of self-interest when it came to 
safety; after all, they were the first ones to the scene of any 
airline accident. Airlines also realized that dead passengers 
and destroyed airplanes made great headlines but were bad for 
business. Airplane manufacturers like Boeing and Douglas 
also knew that broken airplanes created a feeding frenzy for 
American Bar Association members. 
As with any protracted negotiation, there is a point where 
sameone finally comes up with a creative solution that meets 
most of the needs of all at the table. The missing keystone to 
the FAA's safety arch was respondent anonymily. Someone 
wisely suggested ifthe FAA were genuinely interested in only 
obtaining more safety information and not simply wanting to 
drop the hammer on more airmen, then this issue could be 
solved by an independent third party coming to the table. The 
"honest broke?' tmned out to be the National Aeronautics and 
Space A e a t i o n  (NASA). 
The final agreement between the parties came together in 
this way (FAA, 1997): 
The FAA contracted with NASA basically to 
operate the FAA's Aviation Safety Reporting 
Program (ASRP). NASA called its part of the 
partnership th8Aviation Safety Reporting 
System7' (ASRS). In the end, NASA 
subcontracted the actual operation of the 
program out to Battelle Memorial Institute in 
Columbus, Ohio. However, most aviators kept 
calling the incident reporting document "the 
NASA form." 
The crucial position of respondent anonymity 
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was assured by NASA's involvement. A pilot 
reporting an incident would have any iden-g 
i n f d o n  lamdered fiom the report before it was 
passed along to the FAA. Consequently, in nearly all 
cases, the FAA did not have enough identification 
information to go and investigate the reported 
incidents. They had the safety information, but not 
the specific pilot or airline identification, which was 
essential for enforcement action. The FAA still had 
to rely on its traditional means of enforcement 
through informants and spot inspections. The 
aviation coxnm- was so paranoid about this issue 
that the FAA promulgated Federal Aviation 
Regulation (FAR) 91.25, which specifically 
prohibited the FAA fiom using any information on 
the ASRS form for enforcement purposes (FAA, 
1995). To fuaher illustrate the importance and 
effectiveness of the "nspndent anonymity" concept, 
one needed only to look at a recently published FAA 
notice to proposed rule-making: "Protection of 
Voluntarily Submitted Information" (FAA, 1999). 
This proposed Federal Aviation Regulation referred 
to data-sharing programs (called ASAPs), in which 
persons in the aviation community, such as air 
carrier operators, would voluntarily share with the 
FAA information related to safety. An impediment 
to further development of these programs was the 
reluctance of people to share information that, when 
in the hands of a government agency, may be 
required to be released to the public through the 
Freedom of I d d o n  Act or other means. Clearly, 
if the privacy of the shared information were 
guaranteed the effectiveness of these data-sharing 
programs would increase. 
Pilots who used the ASRS were granted immunity 
or a waiver h m  any penalties that arose fiom any 
subsequent FAA e n f i t  action. If convicted, 
the violation would be reported on the pilot's 
r e a r 4  but he or she would not have to serve the 
proposed suspension or pay the h e .  However, the 
FAA flatly stated iht there would be no immunity if 
the incident was caused by a deliberate act of the 
airman, was criminal in nature, or resulted in an 
accident. 
Airmen had 10 days h m  the date of the incident 
to file a report. The FAA did not want to give a 
negltgent pilot the benefit of immunity fiom a 
penalty if the ahman filed a report only after the 
incident happened to be investigated some weeks or 
months later. Subsequent enforcement actions by the 
FAA have indicated that they have been very strict 
in the interpretation of the 10-day filing period. 
A key condition of this social contract was that an 
airman could not take advantage of the immunity or 
waiver ofpenally more than once every 5 years. This 
did not prohibit the filing of numerous incident 
reports, but an airman could exercise the immunity 
provision only once, and then he or she would lose 
the immunity for the 5 subsequent years. This 
obviously was introduced to reduce the recidivism 
rates. 
FILING AN ASRS REPORT 
As a social con- the ASRS has worked remarkably well. 
Since its inception in 1975, over 420,000 incident reports 
have been filed, and c m t  monthly reports range &om 3,000 
to 4,000. NASA employs about 15 former airline pilots, air 
t r a c  controllers, flight attendants, and mechanics to do the 
initial and subsequent in-depth analyses of the incoming 
incident reports (Yodice, 1999). The ASRS acts on the 
information contained in these reports. It idenfifies system 
problems and disseminates the information through its 
CALLBACK newsletter, its Directline journal, and research 
studies. In fact, the ASRS database is a public repository, 
which serves the needs of all agencies and organizations 
involved in the promotion of aviation safety. The following is 
an overview of how NASA processes an incoming incident 
report: 
After an incident report is received at NASA's 
Ames Research Center at Moffet Field, California, 
it is date stamped. Normally, the postmark is the 
relevant date stamp used for the 10-day filing 
period; however, if it is missing, the NASA stamp 
becomes crucial. 
The report is passed on to an analyst for initial 
screening. The analyst can contact the reporting 
airman, since the home telephone number is 
included m the top portion of the report. Sometimes 
clarification is needed to fully analyze the nature of 
the incident. 
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Reports involving accidents andlor criminal activity 
are passed on to the NTSB andfor the U.S. 
Attorney's offices with the airman's identdication 
intact. 
If a clear and immediate safety issue is raised, the 
data are immediately passed on to the FAA and the 
NTSB by way of an "Alert Bulletin." NASA 
removes the identification of all the parties in the 
Alert Bulletin. A good example of this concerns 
Boemg 737 airliners. If NASA receives any reports 
about rudder malfunctions on this particular aircraft, 
it immediately issues an Alert Bulletin. This aircraft 
has been involved in several fatal accidents 
invohiug suspected uncommanded rudder 
excursions. Recently, the NTSB announced the 
probable cause of two of these accidents to be an 
uncontrolled rudder reversal. However, the different 
agencies, as well as the manufacturer, are still 
stumped as to the actual cause of these accidents; 
therefore, they want to get a l l  the possible incident 
information involving the B-737 to assist them in 
preventing future occurrences (McKenq 1999). 
Reports of a less time-sensitive nature are analyzed 
and grouped or coded into various categories in the 
database. 
At this PO& the analyst launders the report of any 
identification clues. The top portion of the form is 
used by the airman for his or her return address and 
telephone contact number. This top portion is 
removed along with the date stamp and returned by 
regular mail to the airman. This becomes the 
airman's proof of reporting the incident if 
subsequent enforcement action is taken. 
Atter all the relevant safety data have been extracted 
from the report, it is destroyed. The only evidence 
that the report ever existed remains in the hands of 
the reporter to be possibly used at some future date. 
Finally, contrary to what many airmen may suspect, the 
filing of a report with NASA concerning an incident or 
occurrence involving a violation of the FARs is considered by 
the FAA to be indicative of a constructive attitude. 
AN AVIATION SAFETY SUCCESS STORY 
As the program enters its 25th year, we should ask 
ourselves: Why has the ASRS worked so well? The FAA has 
to take some major credit for the success. The govemment 
leadership in the early 1970s was genuinely interested in 
aviation safety. They chose to initiate a carefully structured 
balancing act between safety concerns and 
regulatorylenforcement policy. They came to some of the 
following conclusions, which prompted the novel approach: 
The public was not about to confess altruistically to 
each and every negligent safety violation. If 
something was going to elicit the required safety 
information, it needed to have a very strong self- 
interest component to it. 
With a limited number of enforcement officezs 
(about 4,000 aviation safety inspectors nationwide), 
the FAA could not put a cop on every corner. In 
umtrast, the New Yo& Police Department has over 
44,000 policemen (NYPD, 1998). The city could 
literally place a cop on every street comer. 
While e n f i i e n t  was not the goal of the ASRS, it 
was clearly evident that strong enforcement was the 
necessary motive force needed to flush out the 
incident reports. If pilots knew that the incident 
would never be detected by the FAA, they would be 
less inclined to report it. The fear of detection was 
and is the main underlying force for the entire 
program. When effective enforcement is augmented 
by a self-serving immunity provision, the incident 
information floods in. When the incident information 
flows, accidents, with the resultant pain and 
suffering, are avoided. 
What does the ASRS tell us about professional ethics in the 
aviation industry? Airmen are a very well educated, highly 
trained, and well paid group in a very high technology area of 
our society. Notwithstanding a l l  these positive qualities, this 
group of professionals will not altruistically and voluntarily 
step forward and report safety violations that may impugn 
their professional competence and threaten their livelihood. 
The FAA's Manager of the Aviation Safety Reporting 
Program in Washington D.C. recently reported that the 
Stanford University Health Sciences Center showed a great 
deal of interest in implementing something similar to the 
ASRS in the healthcare field (M. Blazy, personal 
communication, June 16, 1999). Medical authorities are 
starting to realize that thousands of safety incidents go 
musported among healthcare practitioners. They also realize 
that there is an impenetrable wall of silence. While most 
pilots' mistakes are written up in the next day's newspaper, 
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doctors get to quietly bury theirs. 
Clearly in the health care industry the threat of enforcement 
and the sanctions associated with violations and incidents are 
somewhat different from what we are used to in aviation. In 
fact, many medical centers and insurance companies have 
been trying to monitor the incidence of adverse outcomes in 
surgery cases and are looking for opportunities for early 
intervention in other medical interventions. These 
organizations feel that both the patient outcome and the claim 
outcome can be favorably influenced by early, appropriate 
intervention. They therefore encourage surgeons to call in 
incident reports. They also remind them that while there is no 
penalty for making an incident report, there may be a penalty 
for failing to do so. Another incentive for participation in 
incident reporting programs by health care providers could be 
lower malpractice iusurance rates. Furthermore, just as with 
the ASRS, respondent anonymity is a key ingredient to a 
successful program. Finally, several specialized medical 
incident reporting systems have been in operation in other 
countries. A case in point is the Critical Incident Reporting 
System at the University of Basel, Swiaerland . This program 
focuses on incident reporting in the field of anesthesiology 
(Helmreich, Schaefer, 1994). One has to realize though that 
regardless of the field, there has to be a self-serving immunity 
provision to make the progam work. 
CONCLUSION 
The question of ethical behavior among our educated elite 
cannot be answered in a positive way. No one wants to take 
reqomiiility for his or her negative actions today. To use an 
old hockey expressb, "everyone wants to skate" or dodge the 
consequences of their advertent or inadvertent actions. The 
law re- to recognize or enforce ethical or moral standards 
among our professional or political elite, so each responsible 
group in society must attempt to overcome this natural 
tendency to "skate," especially when public safety issues are 
involved. Nowhere is this more important than in the fields of 
healthcare and commercial aviation. 
The ASRS, through compromise and an appeal to self- 
interest, does a remarkably good job of eliciting this crucial 
information in a largely unethical society. The results speak 
for themselves. Americans enjoy the safest public air 
transportation system in the world. Last year was the safest 
year in airline history in this country; no major U.S. airline 
suffered a fatal accident in 1998. The ASRS program 
undoubtedly contributed in some degree to this outstanding 
safety record. 
Future challenges in the area of incident reporting will 
include the design of more sophisticated tools to review and 
a d y e  the data generated by the incident reporting systems. 
Researchers also need to develop more specific 
methodologies to capture and analyze human factors 
i n f d o n .  Unless continued progress is made in these areas 
the usefulness of incident data gathering will become 
questionable. However, none of these technical 
recommendations have any meaning without the overall 
integrity of the reporting system. In fact, failure to safeguard 
the anonymity and the procedures associated with the ASRS 
or any other incident reporting system can result in long-term 
tragedy (=accidents) and a violation of public trust.0 
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